Diversi®ed ®rms trade at a discount relative to comparable portfolios of stand-alone ®rms. One explanation is that these ®rms have inecient internal capital markets. We examine the link between ®rm value and the value of internal capital markets using a new form of corporate restructuring called tracking stock. We present a model that illustrates that the announcement eect of a tracking stock equity restructuring conveys information about the marketÕs assessment of the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. We develop a measure of the pro®tability of the internal capital market, and we ®nd a strong positive relation between it and tracking stock announcement eects, a ®nding consistent with our model. Ó
Introduction
Does the market value diversi®cation, and if so, do diversi®ed ®rms have valuable internal capital markets? The answer to the ®rst part of the question appears to be no. The literature ®nds that on average, diversi®ed ®rms trade at a signi®cant discount to the sum of the stand-alone values of their separate businesses.
1 The answer to the second part of the question is still in contention. One often-mentioned viewpoint is that the factor driving the diversi®ca-tion discount is inecient investment policy. For example, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that diversi®ed ®rms may overinvest in lines of business with poor investment opportunities when it would be better to pay the funds out to shareholders.
2 By contrast, a number of authors ± including Weston (1970) , Williamson (1975) and more recently Stein (1997) ± argue that diversi®ed ®rms have at least the potential for valuable internal capital markets in that resources from cash-rich divisions with poor growth opportunities may be funneled to divisions with better investment opportunities.
However, existing evidence on the investment policies of diversi®ed ®rms supports the view that they often invest ineciently. Berger and Ofek (1995) ®nd that the diversi®cation discount is positively related to proxies for overinvestment and cross-subsidization. Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) ®nd that investment in one business segment depends on the performance of sibling segments, rather than solely on the segmentÕs own investment opportunities. Indeed, Scharfstein (1998) ®nds that industry-adjusted capital expenditures of divisions in the same ®rm are negatively related to the industry TobinÕs q. Similarly, Rajan et al. (2000) ®nd that diversi®ed ®rms with a greater dispersion of investment opportunities tend to transfer resources from large divisions with good investment opportunities to small divisions with poor investment opportunities.
These papers suggest that internal capital markets are inecient and that this is a key driver of the diversi®cation discount. However, recent work casts some doubt on this conclusion. Hyland (1999) shows that diversi®ed ®rms were poor performers prior to becoming diversi®ed. Similarly, Campa and Kedia (1999) show that lower valued ®rms tend to diversify, and that when the diversi®cation decision is controlled for the diversi®cation discount is 1 See, for example, Berger and Ofek (1995) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) . 2 More recently, a number of authors argue that rent-seeking or power-grabbing behavior on the part of divisional managers may lead to inecient investment policies in diversi®ed ®rms. For example, see Meyer et al. (1992) , Fulghieri and Hodrick (1997) , Scharfstein and Stein (1997) and Rajan et al. (2000) . negligible. 3 Additionally, a growing body of work has started to uncover conditions under which internal capital market transactions are value-enhancing. Billett and Mauer (1999) ®nd that the diversi®cation discount is negatively correlated with cross-subsidies to segments of a diversi®ed ®rm that would likely be credit constrained as stand-alone ®rms. Hubbard and Palia (1999) ®nd that bidder returns in diversifying mergers during the 1960s are signi®cantly higher when ®nancially unconstrained buyers acquire constrained targets. Finally, Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Fauver et al. (1999) ®nd little evidence of a diversi®cation discount in emerging markets, suggesting that internal capital markets of diversi®ed ®rms replicate external capital markets and institutions that are missing in emerging economies.
The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the link between the value of a diversi®ed ®rm and the value of its internal capital market. Specifically, we examine the abnormal returns to announcements of tracking stock equity restructurings, which we argue will include the marketÕs assessment of the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market. The unique contribution of this approach is that the marketÕs assessment of the value of a diversi®ed ®rmÕs internal capital market can be observed directly, thereby allowing us to determine whether internal capital market transactions for this group of diversi®ed ®rms in¯uence ®rm value.
Tracking stock is a form of common equity that is intended to track the performance of a particular business line within the ®rm. Unlike more common forms of corporate restructuring where ®rms may spin-o businesses to form legally separated stand-alone ®rms, tracking stock links separate equity issues of a company to speci®c business lines within the company without legally splitting up the company. The goal is to create quasi-pure plays with separate equity securities that track the ®nancial performance of distinct business segments within the ®rm without losing the ability to engage in internal capital market transactions between the business segments. The individual tracking stocks of a single company may have dierent dividend, voting, liquidation, and redemption provisions, presumably to tailor the stock to the characteristics of the business line the stock is intended to re¯ect. In addition, tracking stock allows managerial compensation to be tied not only to overall ®rm performance, but also to the performance of the speci®c business line tied to the tracking stock issue. However, unlike a spin-o, equity carve-out, or outright asset sale, which also divide the company along business lines, tracking stock does not legally separate the assets and liabilities of the tracked business from the company as a whole. Thus, tracking stock preserves the internal capital market while other forms of restructuring destroy it.
Because ®rms adopting tracking stock could have chosen a spin-o or the outright sale of business segments instead, the decision to establish a tracking stock equity structure provides a unique opportunity to study an event that conveys information about a ®rmÕs decision to preserve its internal capital market. Using a simple model, we argue that the stock price reaction to the ®rmÕs announcement to establish a tracking stock equity structure should reect the marketÕs assessment of the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market.
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Note that we are not claiming that the marketÕs reaction solely re¯ects its assessment of the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market. Indeed, we argue below that relative to other forms of corporate restructuring, a tracking stock equity structure preserves any bene®ts arising from the co-insurance eect of corporate debt, maintains certain tax bene®ts of a diversi®ed enterprise and may have lower corporate overhead costs. Nevertheless, after controlling for these factors, the stock price reaction to the ®rmÕs announcement to adopt a tracking structure should include an assessment of the value of its internal capital market. We construct a sample of every exchange-traded company that has adopted or proposed a tracking stock equity structure from the ®rst such structure in the early 1980s up through the ®rst quarter of 1997. The ®nal sample comprises twenty-four tracking stock proposals by eighteen dierent companies. All but two of the tracking stock proposals are in the 1990s. The companies in the sample form a wide cross-section of diversi®ed companies, ranging from USX Corporation, a large conglomerate with businesses in steel, oil and natural gas, to Genzyme, a diversi®ed biotechnology company. Despite the diversi®ed nature of these ®rms, we ®nd only mixed evidence that they trade at signi®cant discounts relative to comparable portfolios of specialized ®rms. Moreover, we ®nd that on average these ®rms trade at a substantial premium relative to control portfolios of ®rms having similar degrees of diversi®cation.
We typically ®nd positive stock price reactions at the announcement of a tracking stock equity structure. Nevertheless, there is considerable cross-sectional variability in sample ®rmsÕ announcement-period abnormal returns. To test our modelÕs prediction that tracking stock announcement eects should re¯ect the value of internal capital market transactions, we construct a measure of the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. Using Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) data, we measure the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market as the sum across a ®rmÕs business segments of the product of each segmentÕs excess capital expenditures and its industry-adjusted return on investment, where excess capital expenditures are de®ned as capital expenditures minus cash¯ow. This measure captures the net value of cross-subsidization and can be positive or negative depending on whether a ®rm subsidizes the capital expenditures of business segments earning positive or negative industry-adjusted returns. Consistent with our model, we ®nd a strong positive relation between tracking stock announcement-period returns and our internal capital market measure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explore the various features of tracking stock and compare the eects of these features to those of other forms of corporate restructuring. Section 3 presents a simple model of the information content of tracking stock announcements and develops empirical predictions. Section 4 discusses the construction of our internal capital market measure. Section 5 discusses the prior literature on tracking stock and presents the sample of tracking stock ®rms. Section 6 compares the diversi®cation discount of these ®rms to that of similarly diversi®ed peer ®rms. The main results of the paper are presented in Section 7, where we compute tracking stock announcement eects and relate them to our internal capital market measure and control variables. Section 8 contains a summary and discusses the implications of our results for the diversi®cation discount literature.
Tracking stock
Tracking stock is common stock of a company that is linked to a speci®c business segment within the company.
5 Theoretically, the return on tracking stock is intended to re¯ect only the operating performance of the speci®c business segment to which it is linked. However, regardless of how many classes of tracking stock a company may have, they all represent ownership interest in the company as a whole, and do not represent a legal ownership claim in the tracked business segment. Thus, a tracking stock equity structure eectively splits up a diversi®ed ®rmÕs operations into quasi-pure plays without a legal separation of corporate assets and liabilities. In particular, each class of 5 Tracking stock is sometimes referred to as alphabet stock, letter stock, or targeted stock. The names alphabet stock and letter stock arose out of General MotorsÕ acquisitions of Electronic Data Systems and Hughes Aircraft in the 1980s. Tracking stock re¯ecting an economic interest in GMÕs EDS subsidiary was known as GM-E stock, and stock re¯ecting an economic interest in GMÕs Hughes Aircraft subsidiary was known as GM-H stock. The term targeted stock was coined by Lehman Brothers when they assisted USX Corporation with their tracking stock equity restructuring in the early 1990s.
tracking stock continues to be responsible for all of the ®rmÕs liabilities, and the return on one tracked stock may in¯uence the return on another, because legal ownership of all assets remains with the company as a whole. 6 As we discuss later, however, the individual classes of tracking stock may have dierent voting rights, liquidation rights, dividend policies, and redemption provisions.
In most cases, tracking stock is created when the company authorizes one or more new classes of its common stock and designates speci®c business lines to be tracked by that stock. The existing common stock is then redesignated to track the operating performance of the companyÕs remaining business or businesses. The newly authorized common stock may then be sold in an offering to the public or distributed to existing shareholders via a special dividend. Tracking stock can be issued tax free as a class of the parentÕs stock, while a spin-o is tax-free only if the parent and the subsidiary have been combined for at least ®ve years.
A handful of tracking structures have also been created as the result of the acquisition of one ®rm by another. Examples include General MotorsÕ acquisitions of Electronic Data Systems and Hughes Aircraft in 1984 and 1985, respectively. In these cases, the acquiring company authorizes a new class of stock designed to track the economic performance of the acquired company and uses that stock as the acquisition currency. The acquiring companyÕs existing common stock is then redesignated to track all of the companyÕs businesses excluding the newly-acquired business. The typical motivation for using tracking stock to eect a merger is the reluctance of the acquired ®rmÕs shareholders to dilute the upside potential of their share holdings in the acquired company by exchanging their shares for shares in the acquiring company. Tracking stock helps overcome this problem by giving these shareholders a quasi-pure play of their original investment in the post-acquisition ®rm.
While tracking stock is sometimes used as an acquisition currency, the majority of tracking stock proposals cite other reasons for adopting such an equity structure. These reasons are also often cited to justify why ®rms engage in other forms of equity restructuring, such as carve-outs and spin-os. 7 First, 6 An excellent example that illustrates the link between tracking stocks is given by Hass (1996) . He describes what happened to Genzyme CorporationÕs tracking stock prices when it agreed in May 1996 to purchase Deknatel Snowden Pencer, for $250 million in cash. The business and the cost to acquire it were attributed to GenzymeÕs General Division Tracking Stock. The market thought that the purchase price was too high and the General Division Tracking Stock decreased by about 4.5% at announcement. Despite the fact that GenzymeÕs Tissue Repair Division Tracking Stock was not involved in the acquisition, its stock price also decreased by about 2%.
7 See, for instance, Smith (1983, 1986) , Hite and Owers (1983) , Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) , Cusatis et al. (1993) and Slovin et al. (1995) . many ®rms adopting a tracking structure claim that it will enhance the transparency of their assets, unlocking the hidden value in their diversi®ed operations. 8 The goal is to eliminate the diversi®cation discount by spurring the ®nancial markets to more closely follow, research, and monitor the companyÕs tracked businesses. Second, some ®rms argue that having multiple issues of tracking stock provides¯exibility in raising outside equity or in the use of equity as currency in future acquisitions.
Another argument is that a tracking structure allows the ®rm to link managerial compensation to the performance of the business line where the manager has direct responsibility. For example, Pittston Corporation has three tracking stock issues linked to their three distinct business lines: coal mining, security, and air transport. PittstonÕs board argues that their tracking stock equity structure enhances the eectiveness of pay-for-performance compensation.``Because managementÕs non-cash incentives are largely in the form of stock-based compensation measured only on the tracking stock of their particular business, motivation to further improve shareholder value is increased. '' 9 In fact, all of the tracking stock proposals we encountered state that a motivating factor in adopting a tracking stock equity structure is the enhanced ability to tailor management incentives to the performance of their respective business lines.
Although these reasons for adopting a tracking structure are shared with other forms of equity restructuring, there are several distinctive features of tracking stock. First, a tracking structure preserves an internal capital market that would otherwise be destroyed if the ®rmÕs businesses were split via a spino. Thus, with a tracking structure, the company may continue to reallocate resources across business segments, preserving any operating synergies between segments. Second, a tracking structure preserves the co-insurance eect of diversi®cation, potentially lowering the cost of debt funds because the asset base of the consolidated entity continues to back the debt. By contrast, a spun-o subsidiary can only borrow against its own smaller asset base. Third, because a tracking stock company pays corporate taxes as a consolidated entity, operating losses from one tracked business can be used to shield taxable income in another tracked business. Finally, a tracking stock structure may have lower corporate overhead costs than a spin-o or an equity carve-out, because such costs can be spread over a larger corporate entity with a single executive management team and board of directors. Note that all four features stem from the consolidation bene®ts of a diversi®ed company. The key distinction between a tracking stock structure and other forms of equity restructuring is that it preserves a ®rmÕs internal capital market. Because the asset structure of a ®rm is unaltered by tracking stock, any bene®ts or costs from the cross-subsidization of one business segment by another remain unchanged. Although this seems reasonably clear, it is less clear whether tracking stock announcement eects contain information about the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. The connection is perhaps best seen by noting that ®rms proposing tracking stock structures are also likely candidates for a spino. For example, Hass (1996) documents that the popular press accounts surrounding ®rmsÕ decisions to pursue a tracking structure typically focus on the costs and bene®ts of a tracking stock structure relative to other more common forms of equity restructuring. Indeed, many ®nancial analysts appear to be surprised by ®rmsÕ decisions to choose a tracking structure. Because the market likely expected a spin-o or an equity carve-out, and because these forms of equity restructuring destroy a ®rmÕs internal capital market, the announcement eect of a tracking structure should re¯ect an assessment of the preservation of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. Thus, if the ®rmÕs internal capital market is inecient and thereby reduces ®rm value, we would expect the market to react negatively to the announcement of a tracking stock structure, all else being equal. We would expect the opposite reaction if a ®rmÕs internal capital market were value-enhancing.
A simple model of equity restructuring helps motivate our empirical tests. Consider a diversi®ed ®rm with two business segments (A and B), and de®ne the following variables:
10 Some have argued that a tracking stock structure can actually impede a takeover and thereby be harmful to shareholders. Because there are multiple issues of stock, an acquirer cannot take over a business unit by buying a majority of its stock. The acquirer needs a majority of all classes of stock. As a result, certain high-pro®le business units may actually trade at a lower value under a tracking structure than if they were stand-alone companies, because the probability of receiving a premium takeover oer is reduced.
V A value of business segment A if it were a stand-alone ®rm, V B value of business segment B if it were a stand-alone ®rm, v I value of the diversi®ed ®rmÕs internal capital market, Note that v I captures the impact on ®rm value of internal capital market transactions between the business segments. By contrast, the diversi®cation discount, v D , captures the remaining impact on ®rm value attributable to diversi®cation. For example, v D may include the value loss from a lack of managerial focus or a lack of asset transparency due to conglomeration.
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Consider the value of the ®rm under three polar cases. If the probability of a restructuring were zero (i.e., P S P T 0), then the diversi®ed ®rm value would equal
Alternatively, if the ®rm chooses to separate its business subsidiaries through a spin-o, the combined value of the post spin-o ®rms would simply equal
Note that a spin-o eliminates the diversi®cation discount but also destroys the internal capital market. Lastly, if the ®rm chooses a tracking structure, the diversi®ed ®rm value would equal
where 0 6 d 6 1 represents the proportion of the diversi®cation discount not eliminated when the ®rm adopts a tracking structure. There are two key features of post tracking stock ®rm value. First, a tracking stock structure fully preserves the diversi®ed ®rmÕs internal capital market. Second, and less important for our purposes, tracking stock may not completely eliminate the diversi®cation discount. For example, if a tracking stock structure does not render the same degree of focus achieved by a spin-o, then d b 0.
v D value of the diversi®cation discount, net of the value of the internal capital market, P S marketÕs assessment of the probability that the ®rm restructures through a spin-o, P T marketÕs assessment of the probability that the ®rm restructures using tracking stock, 1 À P S À P T marketÕs assessment of the probability of no restructuring.
11 In reality, the diversi®cation discount would also re¯ect any enhancement or detraction of ®rm value due to internal capital markets. We choose to separate the impact of diversi®cation on ®rm value into a component re¯ecting only the value of the internal capital market, v I , and a remaining net component, v D , to highlight the link between the announcement eect of a tracking stock proposal and the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market.
Given these three polar but exhaustive scenarios for ®rm value, consider the value of the diversi®ed ®rm when the market expects a nonzero probability of either a spin-o or a tracking structure. In this case, ®rm value will equal
which is simply a weighted average of the ®rmÕs values under spin-o, tracking stock, and no restructuring. Now, consider the change in ®rm value if the ®rm announces that it plans to implement a tracking stock equity structure. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that prior to the announcement P T 1 À P S , i.e., the market places zero probability on the case of no restructuring. Thus, the announcement eect of a tracking structure is equal to
As seen in (5), the change in ®rm value at announcement is equal to the marketÕs assessment of the probability of a spin-o times the dierence between the value of the internal capital market and the component of the diversi®ca-tion discount that is not eliminated under a tracking stock equity structure. The intuition is straightforward. Prior to the tracking stock announcement, the market impounds its expectation of the valuation consequences of a spin-o into the value of the ®rm. This includes the anticipated loss of the internal capital market and the elimination of the diversi®cation discount. Thus, at the announcement of a tracking structure, the market re-values the ®rm to re¯ect the recapture of the anticipated loss of the internal capital market, P S v I , and the reinstatement of P S dv D of the diversi®cation discount. From Eq. (5) it is clear that the announcement eect of a tracking structure critically depends on the marketÕs assessment of the likelihood of a spin-o, P S . If P S 0 then we would not expect the announcement eect of a tracking stock to contain any information about the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market. Indeed, in this case, our model would predict a zero announcement eect.
There is one additional issue that requires comment. We have implicitly assumed that P S is exogenous, and is therefore not a function of the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market. In reality, ®rms perceived to have the most valuable internal capital markets may be least expected to undertake a spin-o. In other words, P S may be a decreasing function of v I . If this is the case, then the correlation between the announcement eect of a tracking structure and empirical proxies for the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market could be zero or negative. In any case, to the extent that P S is inversely related to the value of the ®rmÕs internal capital market, there will be a downward bias imparted to the correlation between tracking stock announcement eects and measures of a ®rmÕs internal capital market.
Empirical measures of the internal capital market and diversi®cation discount
The analysis suggests that tracking stock announcements may indeed provide empirical evidence on the marketÕs valuation of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. Our model suggests that we should expect to ®nd a positive relation between the change in ®rm value at the announcement of a tracking stock structure (as measured by abnormal stock returns) and measures of the ®rmÕs internal capital market (developed below). Furthermore, we would expect that tracking stock announcement eects are negatively related to measures of the ®rmÕs diversi®cation discount (discussed below), to the extent that a tracking stock structure does not completely eliminate any pre-track discount from diversi®cation (i.e., d b 0).
Internal capital market measures
We require a proxy for the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market for our tests. Using a ®rmÕs Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) data for the ®scal yearend immediately preceding the tracking stock announcement date, we measure the value of its internal capital market as the sum across segments of the product of each segmentÕs excess capital expenditures and its industry-adjusted return on investment, where excess capital expenditures are de®ned as segment capital expenditures minus segment cash¯ow. Our measure of excess capital expenditures is intended to re¯ect the component of investment attributable to the internal capital market, while the industry-adjusted return on investment is intended to capture the pro®tability of investing in that segment. We compute two internal capital market measures: one based on segment capital expenditures in excess of segment before-tax cash¯ow (INTERNAL1) and the other based on segment capital expenditures in excess of segment after-tax cash¯ow (INTERNAL2). In addition, each measure is scaled by either assets or sales to make them comparable across ®rms.
The internal capital market measures for a ®rm are speci®ed as follows:
where N is the number of business segments, AI i is the accounting item (assets or sales) for segment i, AI S is the sum of the values of the accounting item for the ®rmÕs segments, CF i is the ith segmentÕs cash¯ow (earnings before interest and taxes EBIT i plus depreciation), Ind i CFaAI mf is the ratio of cash¯ow to an accounting item (assets or sales) for the median single-segment ®rm in segment i Õs industry, 13 CAPEX i is the ith segmentÕs capital expenditures, and ATCF i in INTERNAL2 is the ith segmentÕs after-tax cash¯ow. The value for ATCF i is computed as
where S i Ind i IaS mf is the ith segmentÕs imputed interest expense (segment sales times the ratio of interest expense to sales for the median single-segment ®rm in segment iÕs industry), Ind i T aEBT mf is the ratio of taxes paid to pre-tax income for the median single-segment ®rm in segment iÕs industry, and D i is the ith segmentÕs depreciation expense.
14 Note in the equations for INTERNAL1 and INTERNAL2 that we do not allow excess capital expenditures to exceed total capital expenditures. In addition, segments with capital expenditures less than their own cash¯ow are de®ned to have no excess capital expenditures.
An example will help clarify the interpretation of our internal capital market measures. Consider a ®rm with $1 billion in assets split equally between two business segments. For the year, capital expenditures in the ®rst segment were less than after-tax cash¯ow. So this segmentÕs capital expenditures were not subsidized by the internal capital market. Alternatively, the second segmentÕs 13 Industry classi®cation is de®ned using 4-digit SIC codes as long as there are at least 5 standalone peers with sucient data. Otherwise, we use 3-digit SIC codes or 2-digit SIC codes.
14 Note that the Compustat Industry Segment tapes only report net sales, EBIT, depreciation, capital expenditures, and assets for each of a ®rmÕs segments. Thus, to calculate segment after-tax cash¯ow, we must impute the segmentÕs interest expense and tax rate. capital expenditures were $100 million while its after-tax cash¯ow was only $50 million. According to our measure, $50 million of the second segmentÕs capital expenditures were subsidized. 15 Whether this excess investment is valuable is determined by comparing the return on assets (or sales) for the segment to the comparable return for the median single-segment ®rm in the segmentÕs industry. Suppose, for instance, that segment twoÕs return on assets is 15% while that for the median single-segment same-industry ®rm is 10%. Using this information, we compute INTERNAL2 [(0.15 ) 0.10)($50 million)]/ ($1000 million) 0.0025.
Diversi®cation discount measures
Our model also predicts that, all else equal, the announcement eect of a tracking stock structure should be decreasing in the net diversi®cation discount, v D ; the impact of diversi®cation on ®rm value due to factors other than the internal capital market. Following Berger and Ofek (1995) , we compute the excess value of a diversi®ed ®rm relative to a portfolio of industry-matched single segment ®rms. We use the excess value measure as an inverse proxy for the diversi®cation discount. 16 Using a ®rmÕs CIS data for the ®scal year-end immediately preceding the tracking stock announcement date, we compute excess value as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the ®rmÕs actual value to its imputed value. A ®rmÕs actual value is the sum of the total book value of debt, liquidation value of preferred stock, and market value of equity. A ®rmÕs imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segmentÕs imputed value equal to the segmentÕs assets, sales, or EBIT multiplied by its industry median ratio of total capitalization to that accounting item.
17 Each segmentÕs industry median ratios are computed using only single segment ®rms, and are based upon the narrowest SIC grouping that yields ®ve single segment ®rms for which there is sucient data to compute the ratio, stopping at the two digit 15 The source of the additional $50 million could be the excess cash¯ow from the other segment, additional external ®nancing, or both. Note that relative to a stand-alone ®rm, a diversi®ed ®rmÕs debt ®nancing may be cheaper because of the co-insurance eect of diversi®cation, and as argued by Hadlock et al. (1998) a diversi®ed ®rmÕs equity issues may be cheaper because of a smaller adverse selection problem. 16 Berger and Ofek excess value measures capture both the costs and bene®ts of diversi®cation and the impact of internal capital market transactions on ®rm value. An alternative proxy for a ®rmÕs net diversi®cation discount is the residual from a regression of excess value on our internal capital market measure. However, the results reported below are not in¯uenced by whether we use these regression residuals or the raw Berger and Ofek excess value measures as a proxy for the net diversi®cation discount. 17 We follow the steps described in Berger and Ofek (1995) to ensure that segment accounting items sum to Compustat ®rm totals and to treat segments with negative EBITs. level. Thus, for each ®rm proposing tracking stock we compute three estimates of excess value; one each for the cases where the imputed value is based on industry asset multiples, sales multiples, or earnings multiples. We use excess value as an inverse proxy for the diversi®cation discount and predict a positive relation between tracking stock announcement eects and excess value.
Prior studies and sample of tracking stock ®rms
There are only a handful of prior studies on tracking stock. The ®rst indepth discussion of the legal and contractual features of tracking stock is provided by Hass (1996) . Subsequent work by Logue et al. (1996) compared tracking stock to other forms of corporate restructuring. In a sample of eight completed and four canceled or pending tracking stock transactions, they ®nd average announcement period abnormal returns of 2.9% and 1.7%, respectively. Additionally, Zuta (1997) analyzes whether a tracking stock structure can help mitigate suboptimal investment incentives of diversi®ed ®rms. In a sample of 20 tracking stock transactions, she ®nds positive average announcement period abnormal returns and establishes that Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value measures improve in the year following the issuance of tracking stock.
We construct a sample of every ®rm that has adopted or proposed a tracking stock structure. We started our search in 1980, because General Motors was the ®rst ®rm to use tracking stock to eect its acquisitions of Electronic Data Systems and Hughes Aircraft Company in the mid-1980s. For the time period from 1980 through the ®rst quarter of 1997, we searched Lexis/ Nexis for stories containing the key words`tracking stock',`alphabet stock', letter stock',`lettered stock',`target stock', or`targeted stock'. From this search, we identi®ed 24 tracking stock proposals by 18 dierent companies. Speci®c details about the tracking stock proposals were obtained from various SEC ®lings (e.g., proxy statements, prospectuses, 10-Ks and 8-Ks) and news articles. The incredibly detailed article by Hass (1996) was also an indispensable source of information on tracking stock proposals.
Although the sample size is small, we are reasonably con®dent that it includes the entire population of tracking stock proposals. Because we are using the entire population, and not a small sample from a larger population, our subsequent statistical tests will not suer from a small sample bias. Indeed, one could reasonably argue that tests of statistical signi®cance are inappropriate for this`sample'. Nevertheless, we conduct statistical tests in subsequent sections. Table 1 lists the companies, the date the tracking stock proposal was announced, the proposed tracking structure and the outcome (approved or rejected). Tracking stock announcement dates were obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index and Lexis/Nexis. In the few cases where the two sources disagreed about the announcement date, we carefully read the associated news articles to determine the appropriate announcement date. In all cases, we ended up choosing the earlier of the two reported dates. The table lists the tracking stock proposals in chronological order starting with General MotorsÕ acquisitions in the 1980s.
With the exception of General Motors, all of the tracking stock equity structures were proposed in the 1990s. After General MotorsÕ acquisition of Hughes Aircraft Company in 1985, the next tracking stock proposal did not occur until USX Corporation proposed to separate its steel from its oil and gas businesses in 1991. However, the pace of tracking stock proposals has accelerated throughout the 1990s, with one in each of 1991 and 1992, four in each of 1993 and 1994 , ®ve in 1995 , six in 1996 and one up through February 1997 Of the 18 companies proposing tracking stock, 16 are US companies, one is a New Zealand company (Fletcher Challenge) and one is a Canadian company (Inco Limited).
18 Six of the 18 companies did two tracking stock restructurings. For example, in 1993 Pittston Company bifurcated itself into the Services Group and the Minerals Group and in 1995 further subdivided the services group into the Brinks Group and the Burlington Group. PittstonÕs three tracking stocks are named accordingly`Pittston Brinks Group Common Stock,'`Pittston Burlington Group Common Stock,' and`Pittston Minerals Group Common Stock.' Six of the tracking stock proposals are linked to acquisitions: two by General Motors, two by Genzyme, one by Inco Limited, and one by Delmarva Power and Light. Finally, 20 tracking stock proposals were approved by shareholders and four were rejected. Of the four rejected, two were rejected by shareholders ± RJR NabiscoÕs proposal to separate its food and tobacco businesses and KmartÕs proposal to separate it core business and specialty stores ± and two were rejected by management before a formal vote by shareholders ± MCIÕs proposal to separate its various businesses and EpitopeÕs proposal to separate its agricultural and medical biotechnology businesses.
19 Table 2 lists some key features of tracking stock restructurings. In almost all cases, the holders of shares of dierent classes of tracking stock of the same company have an unequal number of votes per share. The disparate voting rights may be either ®xed or variable. GM, TCI, CMS Energy, and Inco 18 Both Fletcher Challenge and Inco Limited are traded on the NYSE as ADRs. 19 For example, in 1993 RJR Nabisco attempted to uncouple its food business from its tobacco business through the use of tracking stocks. Shareholders quickly realized that tracking stock would not prevent the negative impact on its food business of large class-action suits brought against its tobacco business, and rejected the tracking stock proposal. Subsequently, shareholders urged management to pursue a more radical course of action by completely separating the food business from the tobacco business. RJR ended up doing a partial IPO of 19% of its food business in January 1995. Table 1 Companies that adopted or considered a tracking stock equity structure Company Announcement date Proposed tracking stock structure Limited ®x the voting rights of shares of each class of their tracking stocks. For example, the voting rights of each outstanding share of GM Stock (GMÕs car business), GM-E Stock (GMÕs EDS subsidiary), and GM-H Stock (GMÕs Hughes Aircraft subsidiary) are ®xed at one vote, one-quarter of one vote, and one-half of one vote, respectively. By contrast, the remainder of the tracking stock structures have variable voting rights. For these cases, the number of votes per share for one class of stock is ®xed at one while the number of votes per share of the other class or classes is adjusted periodically based on either the per share values or relative market capitalizations of the various classes of tracking stock.
Often the liquidation rights of tracking stock of the same company are set in relation to the relative market values of the various classes of tracking stock. Re¯ecting the fact that tracking stockholders are shareholders of the company as a whole, no one class of tracking stock has a direct claim to the assets of the business group to which their class is economically linked. Thus, in the event of a liquidation, all shareholder classes share in the assets of the ®rm remaining after creditor and preferred stockholder claims are satis®ed.
The dividend policy of a tracking stock is based on the earnings of the underlying tracked business or group of businesses, and is often set to emulate dividend policies of companies operating in similar lines of business. However, the payment of dividends is at the discretion of the board of directors and is limited to funds legally available for the payment of dividends. In addition, a tracking stock corporationÕs articles of incorporation will limit dividends to aǹ available dividend amount,' which is typically speci®ed as the maximum amount that would be legally available for the payment of dividends if the business group to which a tracking stock is linked were a stand-alone corporation. Tracking stock corporations often attempt to increase their investor base by establishing dierent dividend policies for their various classes of tracking stock. For example, US West established a generous dividend policy for its Communications Group Stock to attract`income-oriented' investors, while it established a zero dividend policy for its Media Group Stock to attract growth-oriented' investors. Table 2 shows that virtually all tracking stock structures have redemption provisions that allow a tracking stock corporation to redeem one or more classes of tracking stock in exchange for cash and/or shares of another tracking stock of the company. Notice that the exchange is typically at a ®xed premium of the market value of the tracking stock to be redeemed. For example, consider the Pittston Company tracking stock structure. The companyÕs proxy statement speci®es that the company``may, at any time, exchange each outstanding share of Burlington Stock for shares of BrinkÕs Stock (or, if no BrinkÕs stock is then outstanding, Minerals Stock) having a fair market value equal to 115% of the fair market value of one share of Burlington Stock.'' A similar redemption provision pertains to the exchange of Minerals Stock for shares of BrinkÕs Stock.
Finally, all of the tracking stock structures for which information is available link stock-based incentive compensation to the speci®c group in which an employee works. Referring again to the Pittston Company tracking stock proposal, employees of the three business groups (i.e., Brinks, Burlington and Minerals) would be granted stock options only with respect to their groupÕs tracking stock. However, employees with company-wide responsibilities would be granted stock options across the three groups. Interestingly, the proposal also requires that``non-employee'' members of the board of directors be allocated shares in each of the three tracking stocks and annually, thereafter, be granted stock options in each of the three tracking stocks. 
The diversi®cation discount of tracking stock ®rms
Many studies ®nd that diversi®cation is associated with a discount in ®rm value. Lang and Stulz (1994) ®nd a negative relation between diversi®cation and TobinÕs q in the 1970s and 1980s, and Servaes (1996) documents a similar relation in the 1960s. Comment and Jarrell (1995) document a negative relation between stock returns and various measures of diversi®cation. Berger and Ofek (1995) ®nd that, for the average ®rm, diversi®cation implies a 6% to 12% discount in ®rm value. Given this evidence, it is noteworthy that Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Liebeskind and Opler (1995) ®nd that there was a general trend for ®rms to become less diversi®ed in the 1970s and 1980s.
This evidence provides an interesting backdrop for our sample of tracking stock ®rms, because they have implicitly expressed the belief that it is better to remain diversi®ed than to split-up their various businesses. A natural question is whether tracking stock ®rms suer from a diversi®cation discount prior to the decision to implement a tracking stock structure. For instance, one could argue that managers propose a tracking stock structure because they are entrenched, and such a structure allows them to claim the bene®ts of a spin-o without actually having to relinquish control of a subsidiary. If this were the case, we might expect to ®nd a substantial diversi®cation discount; or at least one that is not dierent from that computed for ®rms with similar degrees of diversi®cation. By contrast, the absence of a discount would suggest that managers do not propose a tracking structure simply to preserve an inecient asset structure. 20 Many tracking stock proposals explicitly mention the potential con¯ict of interest of having one board of directors overseeing multiple classes of tracking stock. PittstonÕs tracking stock proposal is unique in that it attempts to align director interests with the interests of all three classes of stock by requiring that all directors be allocated stock and stock options in each of the three tracking stocks. Hass (1996) provides an in-depth discussion of the extensive intergroup con¯icts and directorial loyalty concerns inherent in tracking stock equity structures. Table 3 presents unadjusted and peer group adjusted excess value measures for each of the tracking stock ®rms, and the mean and median values for the sample. 21 Recall that excess value compares the value of a diversi®ed ®rm to a portfolio of industry-matched single-segment ®rms. The peer group adjusted excess value is the dierence between a ®rmÕs excess value and the contemporaneous mean excess value for diversi®ed ®rms with the same number of business segments. There is a great deal of variability in unadjusted excess value measures across sample ®rms. Excess value measures based on asset multiples are typically negative, and the average and median values are similar in size to those reported in Berger and Ofek (1995) . By contrast, excess value measures based on sales and earnings are mostly positive, with positive sample mean and median values. Thus it appears that unadjusted excess value measures are not well-behaved for our sample of tracking stock ®rms.
Peer group adjusted excess value measures tell a more consistent story. Mean and median adjusted excess value measures are positive irrespective of the multiplier. For instance, median adjusted excess value measures range from 4% using asset multiples to 22% using sales multiples. Thus, tracking stock ®rms tend to have smaller diversi®cation discounts than ®rms having similar degrees of diversi®cation, i.e., ®rms with the same number of business segments. Overall, there is little evidence to support the view that tracking stock managers are entrenched and propose a tracking stock structure only to preserve an inecient asset structure. Table 4 reports market-adjusted abnormal returns for each tracking stock announcement around the announcement date. 22 We could not calculate abnormal returns for Fletcher ChallengeÕs ®rst tracking stock proposal because it was not traded in the US at that time. The average two-day abnormal return on the day before and the day of the announcement is a signi®cant 2.55%, and 19 out of 23 tracking stock announcements have positive two-day abnormal returns. If we extend the event window to include one day after the announcement, the average three-day abnormal return decreases to 1.58% and is no longer statistically signi®cant. However, 16 out of 23 tracking stock announcements have positive three-day abnormal returns. 21 We do not report values for General Motors and Fletcher Challenge because CIS data are not available for these ®rms. 22 We use the return on the S&P 500 index as the proxy for the market return. All measures are computed using the ®rmÕs ®scal year-end data immediately preceding the tracking stock announcement date. Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the ®rmÕs actual value to its imputed value. A ®rmÕs actual value is the sum of the total book value of debt, liquidation value of preferred stock, and market value of equity. A ®rmÕs imputed value is the sum of the imputed values of its segments, with each segmentÕs imputed value equal to the segmentÕs assets, sales, or EBIT multiplied by its industry median ratio of total capitalization to that accounting item. Each segmentÕs industry median ratios are computed using only single segment ®rms, and are based upon the narrowest SIC grouping that yields ®ve single segment ®rms for which there is sucient data to compute the ratio, stopping at the two-digit level. Peer group adjusted excess value is the dierence between a ®rmÕs excess value and the contemporaneous mean excess value for ®rms with the same number of business segments. Recall from Table 1 that six of the tracking stock proposals are tied-in with acquisitions. The six cases are the General Motors EDS and Hughes acquisitions, the two Genzyme acquisitions, Inco LimitedÕs acquisition of Diamond Fields Resources and Delmarva P&LÕs merger with Atlantic Energy. Given that the stock price response to these tracking stock proposals may also contain information about the acquisition, it is instructive to examine the average announcement period abnormal return for the 17 tracking stock announcements that do not involve acquisitions. For this group, the average two-and three-day abnormal returns are 3.08% and 2.24%, respectively.
Results

Tracking stock announcement eects
23 Thus, average tracking stock announcement eects are larger when acquisition-related tracking stock proposals are excluded from the sample.
Tracking stock announcement eects are as large as, if not larger than, announcement eects observed for other forms of equity restructuring. Cusatis et al. (1993) report a two-day average abnormal return of 2.10% for a sample of 146 spin-os during the period 1965±1988. In comparison, Schipper and Smith (1986) report a two-day average abnormal return of 1.83% for a sample of 76 equity carve-outs during the period 1965±1983. In much smaller samples from a more recent time period, Slovin et al. (1995) report two-day average abnormal returns of 1.32% and 1.23% for 37 spin-os and 32 equity carve-outs during the period 1980±1991.
Cross-classi®cation of announcement eects with internal capital market measures
We have the necessary data to calculate internal capital market measures for 21 of the 24 tracking stock ®rms in the year prior to the tracking stock announcement. 24 The mean values for INTERNAL1 and INTERNAL2 are negative, and the median values are zero. Focusing on INTERNAL2 and using assets, 4 (19%) ®rms have a positive INTERNAL2, 11 (52%) ®rms have a negative INTERNAL2 and 6 (29%) ®rms have a zero INTERNAL2. When we use sales, the corresponding numbers are 6 (29%) positive, 9 (43%) negative and 6 (29%) zero. Table 5 reports internal capital market measures cross-classi®ed with tracking stock announcement eects. We can cross-classify 20 tracking stock cases. 25 As predicted by the model, there is a high degree of correlation 23 Using a two-tailed test, the two-day abnormal return is signi®cant at the 1% level and the three-day abnormal return is signi®cant at the 5% level.
24 CIS data are unavailable for the two General Motors tracks (EDS and Hughes) and the second Fletcher Challenge track. 25 In addition to losing General Motors (EDS and Hughes) and the second Fletcher Challenge track because of insucient segment data, we lose the ®rst Fletcher Challenge track because there were no stock returns to calculate announcement period abnormal returns.
between the sign (positive or negative) of the internal capital market measures and the sign (positive or negative) of the tracking stock announcement eect. For instance, in the case of INTERNAL2 using assets, 10 out of 20 cases have either positive internal capital market and positive announcement eect or negative internal capital market and negative announcement eect. Interestingly, of the six cases with both negative internal capital market and negative announcement eect, three were rejected (Kmart, MCI and Epitope) and two were mergers eected with tracking stock (Inco Limited and Delmarva Power and Light). There are no cases with a positive internal capital market and a negative announcement eect. However, there are nine cases where the internal capital market measure is either negative or zero and yet the market reacted positively to the tracking stock announcement. This ®nding suggests that the market perceives bene®ts from the tracking structure not linked to internal capital markets. Alternatively, it may suggest that our internal capital market measure is biased low, making inferences based on the sign of the measure inappropriate and suggesting that its continuous correlation with the announcement eect may be more revealing. Table 6 reports regressions of the three-day abnormal return (the day before, the day of, and the day after the tracking stock announcement) on the various internal capital market measures (INTERNAL1 and INTERNAL2 using either assets or sales), the excess value measure based on assets (EXCESS VALUE), a dummy variable equal to one if tracking stock is used to eect a merger (MERGER), a dummy variable equal to one if a tracking stock proposal is subsequently rejected (REJECTED), and several control variables. The null hypothesis of homoskedastic residuals is rejected at the 1% percent level for most of the reported regressions. Therefore, reported t-statistics are calculated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Regression results
The control variables in the regressions attempt to control for the impact of bene®ts of a tracking structure relative to other forms of corporate restructuring that are not captured in our model. Recall from the discussion in Section 2 that relative to other forms of equity restructuring, tracking stock preserves any bene®ts arising from the co-insurance of corporate debt, allows for operating losses in one tracked business to be used to shield taxable income in another tracked business, and has lower overhead costs because there is a single executive management team and board of directors. We include LEVERAGE (the sum of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to total assets) in the regressions to control for co-insurance. If co-insurance enhances debt capacity, and if the market perceives that a tracking structure preserves the bene®ts associated with the enhanced debt capacity, then we would expect that tracking stock announcement eects are positively related to LEVERAGE. To control a The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal return on the day before, the day of, and the day after the announcement. The explanatory variables are de®ned as follows. The internal capital market measures, INTERNAL1 and INTERNAL2, are the sum across a ®rmÕs business segments of the product of each segmentÕs excess capital expenditures and its industry-adjusted return on investment, scaled by the sum of segments assets or sales. Segment excess capital expenditures is segment capital expenditures minus either segment before-tax cash¯ow (INTERNAL1) or aftertax cash¯ow (INTERNAL2), and segment industry-adjusted return on investment is the ratio of segment EBIT plus depreciation to segment assets (sales) minus the corresponding ratio for the median single-segment ®rm in the segmentÕs industry. EXCESS VALUE is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the ®rmÕs actual value to its imputed value, where actual value is total capitalization and imputed value is computed using asset multiples. MERGER equals one if the proposed tracking stock is the result of an acquisition, and zero otherwise. REJECTED equals one if the proposed tracking stock is subsequently rejected, and zero otherwise. LEVERAGE is total debt to assets, where total debt is long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities. TAX RATE is the ratio of taxes paid to taxable income. SIZE is the natural logarithm of assets measured in 1995 dollars using the producer price index de¯ator. t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors. * Signi®cance at the 10% level. ** Signi®cance at the 5% level. *** Signi®cance at the 1% level.
for tax eects, we include TAX RATE (the ratio of taxes paid to taxable income) in the regressions. The larger a ®rmÕs TAX RATE, the greater the likely tax bene®t of transferring operating losses in a diversi®ed ®rm. We expect a positive relation between tracking stock announcement eects and TAX RATE. Finally, we include SIZE (the natural logarithm of assets measured in 1995 dollars) in the regressions to control for the overhead cost eect. Under the assumption that there are economies of scale in overhead costs, the larger the ®rm the smaller the percentage savings in overhead costs of a tracking structure relative to a spin-o. Accordingly, we expect a negative relation between tracking stock announcement eects and SIZE. All three variables are computed using a ®rmÕs ®scal year-end data immediately preceding the tracking stock announcement date. The regressions provide strong support for the prediction that tracking stock announcement eects are positively related to the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market, with all of the coecient estimates on INTERNAL1 and INTERNAL2 signi®cantly positive at the 5% level. To gauge the economic signi®cance of the coecient estimates, consider the estimate on INTERNAL2 in speci®cation (3). All else being equal, a one standard deviation increase in the internal capital market measure increases the announcement eect by about 3.5% (increasing the average announcement eect from 1.45% to 4.95%). Thus, there is a strong positive link between the value of a tracking stock ®rmÕs internal capital market (as proxied by our internal capital market measure) and the change in the value of the ®rm at the announcement of a tracking structure.
The model in Section 3 predicts that tracking stock announcement eects will be negatively related to the discount from diversi®cation if the market anticipates that tracking stock will not completely eliminate the discount. As such, we would expect a positive coecient estimate on EXCESS VALUE. However, as seen in Table 6 , the coecient estimates on EXCESS VALUE are negative but extremely small, and are never signi®cantly dierent from zero. This suggests either that ®rms proposing tracking stock have little or no diversi®cation discount to begin with (consistent with the ®ndings in Table 3 ), or that the market perceives that a tracking structure is equally eective as other forms of equity restructuring in dissipating any pre-track diversi®cation discount.
The signs of the coecient estimates on the other variables in the regressions are generally consistent with predicted eects. The coecient estimates on MERGER and REJECTED are negative, but only those on MERGER are signi®cant. These results are not surprising because, as seen in Table 5 , two out of four tracking stock mergers (excluding the two General Motors mergers that are not in the regression sample because of insucient data) and three out of four rejected tracking stock proposals have negative announcement eects. The coecient estimates on LEVERAGE are positive but not signi®cant, and the coecient estimates on SIZE are signi®cantly negative at the 10% level. These ®ndings provide only weak support for co-insurance and overhead cost factors in¯uencing tracking stock announcement eects. Finally, inconsistent with the predicted positive eect of a ®rmÕs tax status on tracking stock announcement eects, the coecient estimates on TAX RATE are negative, although not signi®cant.
The strong positive relation between the internal capital market measures and tracking stock announcement eects is robust to a variety of alternative regression speci®cations. In particular, the coecient estimates on the internal capital market measures remain statistically and economically signi®cant if we (1) use the two-day (the day prior to and the day of the announcement) abnormal stock return as the dependent variable, (2) exclude the excess value measure (EXCESS VALUE) from the regressions, and (3) estimate the regressions using only the internal capital market measures. Overall, the preservation of the internal capital market appears to be a driving factor behind the marketÕs generally favorable assessment of tracking stock.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we examine the characteristics of ®rms adopting tracking stock equity structures. Tracking stock announcements oer a unique opportunity to directly observe the marketÕs assessment of the value of a diversi®ed ®rmÕs internal capital market. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1. Firms adopting tracking stock structures have smaller diversi®cation discounts than similarly diversi®ed ®rms. 2. Share price reactions to the announcement of tracking stock structures are typically positive, with average announcement eects at least as large as, if not larger than, announcement eects observed for other forms of equity restructuring. 3. There is a strong positive relation between the marketÕs reaction to a tracking stock announcement and proxies for the value of a ®rmÕs internal capital market. 4. No evidence is found of a relation between the marketÕs reaction to a tracking stock announcement and the diversi®cation discount. These ®ndings provide an interesting contrast to those in the extant literature on the value of diversi®cation. The main ®ndings of this literature are that diversi®ed ®rms, on average, trade at a discount, the discount appears to be driven by inecient internal capital markets, and ®rms in the 1990s have been moving to mitigate the discount by divesting assets to focus on core businesses. By contrast, the diversi®ed ®rms in our sample have rejected this antidiversi®cation trend in favor of tracking stock equity structures that allow for many of the bene®ts of more focused ®rms (e.g., equity securities tied to homogenous and more clearly de®ned operating units) while simultaneously preserving their internal capital markets. The ®ndings that the market generally reacts favorably to these tracking stock structures and that the marketÕs reaction is tied to the value of these ®rmsÕ internal capital markets, is a strong signal of support for this relatively new corporate structure. Nevertheless, given the small number of ®rms that have adopted a tracking stock structure in the 1990s, it is clear that a drive toward focus through more radical forms of corporate restructuring is probably more value-enhancing for the vast majority of diversi®ed ®rms.
